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Abstract 
Human cooperation is likely supported by our tendency to punish selfishness in 
others. Social norms play an important role in motivating third-party punishment, and also 
in explaining societal differences in prosocial behavior. However, there has been little work 
directly linking social norms to the development of third-party punishment across societies. 
In this study, we explored the impact of normative information on the development of 
third-party punishment in 603 children aged 4-14 years, across six diverse societies. Children 
began to perform third-party punishment during middle childhood, and the developmental 
trajectories of this behavior were similar across societies. We also found that social norms 
began to influence the likelihood of performing third-party punishment during middle 
childhood in some of these societies. Norms specifying the punishment of selfishness were 
generally more influential than norms specifying the punishment of prosocial behavior. 
These findings support the view that third-party punishment of selfishness is important in all 
societies, and its development is shaped by a shared psychology for responding to 
normative information. Yet, the results also highlight the important role that children’s prior 
knowledge of local norms may play in explaining societal variation in the development of 
both third-party punishment and prosociality. 
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Social norms and cultural diversity in the development of third-party punishment 
 
Background 
As a species, humans are unusual because we regularly cooperate in large groups of 
unrelated individuals and incur costs to punish violators of social norms. Both theory and 
data suggest that cooperation and punishment are tightly linked [1]. In large groups, the 
temptation to gain the benefits of cooperation without contributing (sometimes called 
“free-riding”) can destabilize cooperation. Selective punishment of third-party individuals 
(Third-Party Punishment) who free-ride can promote cooperation by reducing the benefits 
of free-riding without harming cooperators, making cooperation a relatively more attractive 
choice to individuals [2–4]. The prospect of punishment increases rates of cooperation in 
experimental games [5–7] and plays an important role in sustaining costly forms of altruism 
in societies without coercive institutions [8,9]. Third-Party Punishment (TPP) of non-
cooperators likely plays a stronger role in maintaining cooperation in large groups, relative 
to other mechanisms such as dyadic or indirect reciprocity [10]. Yet, TPP is itself costly to 
individuals and there is a temptation to free-ride on it as well, which is why costly TPP of 
non-cooperators/free-riders is often referred to as ‘altruistic punishment’. This means that 
to understand human cooperation it is important to understand the factors that influence 
individuals’ tendency to engage in TPP [6].  
Some researchers argue that TPP is at least partly motivated by culturally-specific 
norms and institutions (organized systems of norms) [1,8,9,11], which are acquired through 
a universal human psychology for learning and conforming to norms [12]. Norms are 
behavioral standards shared and enforced by a community [13], and they are based on 
expectations about what others in your community do (or think you should do) which 
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motivate your own behavior [14]. There is evidence that culturally-specific norms at least 
partly motivate punishment of non-cooperative or selfish third parties (i.e. altruistic 
punishment) [8,9], but also punishment of prosocial third parties (i.e. antisocial punishment) 
[7,15]. This is important because the tendency to punish selfish third parties increases 
group-level cooperation, but the tendency to punish prosocial third parties decreases group-
level cooperation [7]. The influence of culturally-varying norms for punishment could 
explain the considerable variation across societies in rates of cooperation, likelihood of 
imposing sanctions, and the kinds of behaviors that are sanctioned [7,16–19]. It could also 
account for why levels of prosociality and TPP are positively associated across societies [17].  
Developmental data provide a means to examine the influence of norms on social 
behavior. Experimental evidence from a diverse range of societies suggests that children 
become sensitive to normative information about prosocial behavior during middle 
childhood (about 6-12 years of age), and this precedes or co-occurs with the development of 
culturally-variable adult behavior [12,20,21]. Evidence that children’s sensitivity to 
normative information about punishment is linked to the development of TPP in children 
would support the hypothesis that TPP is at least partly motivated by learned cultural 
norms.  
This evidence would provide important insights into the factors that underlie the 
development of TPP. There is evidence that from a young age children in urban North 
America and Europe protest rule violations and punish certain forms of deviant third-party 
behavior [22–27], including self-maximizing resource allocations by third parties in 
cooperative experimental tasks [28–32]. However, it is not clear whether children’s 
punishment is motivated by awareness of relevant social norms. Moreover, even if children 
are aware of norms at a young age, they may not always be motivated to conform to norms. 
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In particular, it is likely that in situations in which following norms incurs a personal cost, 
children’s conformity to norms may lag behind their knowledge of norms [12]. A good 
example of this comes from a study of children’s behavior in the Dictator Game (DG) 
conducted in Boston, USA [33]. In the DG, a subject is given an endowment (e.g. cash, 
stickers, candy), and is able to allocate a fraction of the endowment to another anonymous 
participant. On average, 3-4 year-old children thought they should allocate about 43% of 
their original endowment of stickers, but on average they actually gave up only 13% of the 
endowment. By 7-8 years of age, children’s allocations matched what they reported they 
were ‘supposed’ to do.  
This suggests that to investigate the link between social norms and TPP, we need to 
investigate how children respond to information about social norms that directs them to 
punish third parties. The age at which children modify their TPP in response to this 
information would mark a developmental increase in children’s tendency to strongly 
conform to social norms for TPP. Given the theoretical connections between TPP and 
prosociality [6], we would expect that norms will begin to motivate TPP at the same age that 
norms begin to influence prosocial behavior: middle childhood [12,21].  
To explore whether the link between social norms and TPP is a product of a universal 
psychology for conforming to social norms, we should study how children in different 
societies respond to social norms for punishing both selfish and prosocial third parties. If 
children’s responsiveness to information about social norms develops similarly across 
societies, this would support the hypothesis that there is a universal human psychology for 
conforming to norms. A universal psychology for conforming to norms is also expected to 
lead to the emergence of societal variation in TPP because the tendencies to perform 
altruistic punishment (i.e. punishing selfish third parties) and antisocial punishment (i.e. 
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punishing prosocial third parties) vary greatly across societies. Evidence suggests that this 
variation (largely documented through studies of adults) is likely due to the fact that the 
content of local punishment norms differs across societies [7].   
We conducted a cross-cultural experimental study of the development of personally-
costly TPP in children. Specifically, we addressed four Research Questions: RQ1: Does TPP 
develop in a uniform way among children across societies? RQ2: At what age during 
development do children become responsive to experimentally-manipulated normative 
information about punishment? RQ3: Does the content of norms influence children’s 
responsiveness to them (i.e. are children equally responsive to information about norms 
that directs the punishment of selfishness or prosociality)? RQ4: Does the development of 
children’s responsiveness to normative information about punishment resemble the 
development of their responsiveness to normative information about prosocial behavior?  
 
Methods 
Participants: 603 children aged 4-14 years from six societies (Table 1, Supplementary 
Table 1). 87 children were excluded for failing at least one comprehension question about 
the procedure (out of seven sets of questions; see ESM for details). 
Overview: The Third-Party Punishment Game (TPPG) is often used to approximate 
social interactions in which punishment could be applied [28,34]. We used a version of the 
TPPG which was designed to be both child-appropriate and comparable across field sites. 
Subjects were told about the choices of third parties in a discrete form of the Dictator Game 
(DG), in which the third party could make either (i) a prosocial choice or a (ii) self-maximizing 
choice. Subjects were then given an opportunity to allocate some of their own endowment 
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(i.e. their payoff) to punish the third party. Additional Methodological Details are available 
in the ESM.  
Procedure: Subjects were introduced to uniquely colored people-shaped figurines 
and told that each represented an unknown person from their community. Third parties and 
Recipients were represented by these figurines. Subjects were told that the third parties 
“play the game at a different time”, and this was true: the third party was a participant in a 
parallel study in which children made DG choices knowing that they could be punished by 
someone else. Subjects’ punishment decisions in the current study were used to modify the 
third party’s payoffs in this parallel study. 
Subjects were told that third parties could select either one of two laminated paper 
trays, examples of which were placed in front of the Subject (Figure 1). Each tray was 
marked with a red and a blue circle, and tokens were placed in the circles: any tokens placed 
in the red circle would go to the third party, and any tokens placed in the blue circle would 
go to the Recipient. One tray corresponded to the prosocial outcome (1 reward for the third 
party and 1 reward for a Recipient; 1/1), and the second corresponded to the self-
maximizing (“selfish”) outcome (2 rewards for the third party and 0 rewards for a Recipient; 
2/0). By selecting a tray, third parties selected either the 1/1 or 2/0 outcome in the DG. 
Subjects were next told that, if they wanted to, they could give the experimenter one 
of their own tokens (out of a supply of three provided at the start of each trial) and in 
exchange the experimenter would take one token from the amount that would be obtained 
by the third party (based on the third party’s choice in the DG). Both the given and taken 
tokens would be removed from the game (meaning that punishment was costly, as it 
reduced the payoffs of both the subject and the third party). If children chose to keep all 
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their tokens, no tokens would be taken from the third party (meaning that the third party 
would not be punished).  
Subjects then viewed a short video in which an adult model verbalized normative 
information about the different possible choices subjects could make in the TPPG (we refer 
to this normative information as the ‘norm prime’). Videos used a standardized script, but 
were recorded separately at each field site using local translations of the script and local 
adults as models (models were selected to be unfamiliar to the subjects, but were not 
matched by age or sex across sites). Subjects saw one of three norm prime videos: 
Punish-Selfish: a directed norm prime that indicated that 2/0 was ‘wrong’ and ‘it is 
good to take a token from someone who chooses this', and also that 1/1 was ‘right’ and ‘it is 
bad to take a token from someone who chooses this'. Here, the norm prime specifies 
punishing selfish third parties.  
Punish-Prosocial: a directed norm prime that 2/0 was ‘right’ and ‘it is bad to take a 
token from someone who chooses this', and also that 1/1 was ‘wrong’ and ‘it is good to take 
a token from someone who chooses this’. Here, the norm prime specifies punishing 
prosocial third parties.  
Punish-Either: an undirected norm prime that indicated that 2/0 was ‘ok’ and ‘it is ok 
to take a token from someone who chooses this', and  that 1/1 was ‘also ok’ and ‘it is also ok 
to take a token from someone who chooses this'. This provides an ideal reference condition 
because the model’s actions in the video (with respect to 2/0 and 1/1) are closely matched 
to both the ‘Punish-Selfish’ and ‘Punish-Prosocial’ videos, but the content of the norm prime 
does not specify punishing any behavior by third parties as it does in the two ‘directed’ 
conditions.  
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After viewing the video, the two primary test trials were conducted. At the start of 
each trial, subjects were allocated three tokens and asked whether they wanted to (i) give 
one token to the experimenter (i.e. punish the third party), or (ii) keep all of their tokens 
(i.e. not punish). In the ‘Selfish Third-Party Trial’, subjects chose whether to punish a third 
party who had previously chosen 2/0 in the DG (the self-maximizing outcome) . In the 
‘Prosocial Third-Party Trial’, subjects chose whether to punish a third party who had 
previously chosen 1/1 in the DG (the prosocial outcome). The order of these trials was 
randomized across subjects by a tablet computer used to record the data.  
Addressing Research Questions: To answer RQ1, a sample of children in each society 
was presented with the undirected norm prime: Punish-Either. We used results from this 
experimental condition to compare the probability of punishing selfish and prosocial third 
parties, and to assess ontogenetic changes in the likelihood of punishing selfish and 
prosocial third parties within and across societies.  
To answer RQ2, in each society we presented two additional samples of children 
with one of the two directed norm primes: Punish-Selfish or Punish-Prosocial. We compared 
the impact of each of the directed primes on the likelihood of punishing selfish and prosocial 
third parties. We also explored how the effects of these norm primes changed with age, 
whether the effects of the primes varied across societies, and whether the primes 
influenced punishment of selfish and prosocial third parties to the same extent. 
To answer RQ3, we determined whether the Punish-Selfish prime increased 
children’s tendency to punish selfish third parties more than prosocial third parties (relative 
to children given the Punish-Either prime), and also whether the Punish-Prosocial prime 
decreased children’s tendency to punish selfish third parties more than prosocial third 
parties (relative to children given the Punish-Either prime). We then compared the 
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magnitude of these effects, to determine whether either the Punish-Selfish or Punish-
Prosocial primes influenced children to a greater degree. 
To answer RQ4, we compared the effects of the norm primes on children’s 
punishment behavior in the present study (i.e. RQ2) to the effects of similar norm primes on 
the same children’s prosocial behavior in a prior published study [12].  
Task comprehension: Subjects understood third parties’ decisions in the DG, 
because they had previously made their own decisions in a DG at the start of the testing 
session, before being presented with the two TPPG trials. This DG also involved viewing a 
norm prime video. Norm primes in the DG and TPPG were always congruent in content (i.e. 
they always stated that the same choices were ‘good’ and ‘bad’). Analysis of children’s 
choices in this DG can be found in [12] (we do not analyze the relationship between 
children’s choices in the DG and in the TPPG in this paper). Children also passed seven sets 
of Comprehension Questions (CQs) which asked children to explain the task procedures (see 
ESM for details on children who were excluded for answering CQs incorrectly).  
Rewards: Subjects were told that “the more tokens they received, the more rewards 
they would receive”, but the precise nature of the rewards or the exchange rate was not 
communicated to subjects so as to reduce differences in the perceived value of the payoffs 
across sites. After the study, tokens were exchanged for rewards (locally sourced small food 
items, or prizes such as stickers).  
Statistical modeling approach: We used statistical analyses which are well-suited to 
deriving inferences from the complex hierarchical data produced by this study. All data were 
binary choices taking the form of “1” (subject chose to punish) or “0” (subject chose NOT to 
punish). We modeled subjects’ choices using regression with a binomial link function. The 
posterior distribution of the model was estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo, where 
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we generated model predictions by processing many samples from the posterior 
distribution of the model. Data were analyzed in the R Environment for Statistical 
Computing version 3.5.1 [35], with most models specified using the function ‘map2stan’ (R 
package ‘rethinking’ version 1.59), a convenience tool for fitting different regression models 
[36]. Multilevel models were run using a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (an algorithm 
particularly good with high dimension models) implemented in RStan version 2.18.2 [37]. 
Models were specified using weakly informative priors, which reduce overfitting and also 
help the Markov chain to converge to the posterior distribution more effectively than flat 
priors. The posterior distribution we present here is based on 15000 samples from three 
chains (after 3000 adaptation steps), for a total of 36000 samples. These samples were 
sufficient to establish convergence to the target posterior distribution. We assessed 
convergence through (a) visual inspection of the chains, (b) the R-hat Gelman and Rubin 
statistic (~1.00 for all parameters, R-hat values greater than 1.01 can indicate that the chain 
did not converge), and (c) the effective number of samples for all parameters were 
reasonable (though the chains were inefficient, requiring large numbers of overall samples).  
 
Results 
We evaluated five models to predict the likelihood that children will give up a token 
to punish a third party, each capturing a different hypothesis about the factors that 
influence TPP (Table 2). The model which receives the most WAIC weight, Model 5, indicates 
that the third party’s behavior (selfish, prosocial), norm content (Punish-Prosocial, Punish-
Selfish, or Punish-Either), subject age, and site/society all influence punishment outcomes. 
We answer all four research questions using the results of Model 5, which we present 
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graphically because the complexity of the model makes numerical results difficult to 
interpret (see the ESM for some numerical results). 
 
RQ1: Does TPP develop in a uniform way among children across societies?   
The Punish-Either norm prime condition captures children’s tendency to punish 
selfish and prosocial third parties in the absence of normative information specifying the 
punishment of either. For this reason, the model’s estimates for the Punish-Either condition 
provide the clearest view on the development of TPP (additional analyses in the ESM show 
similar developmental patterns for the Punish-Selfish and Punish-Prosocial conditions). 
Across the six societies, children were more likely to punish selfish third parties than 
prosocial third parties, with the 95% confidence intervals indicating that this pattern 
increases with age and becomes reliable by at least age 9 (Figure 2A). Qualitatively similar 
developmental patterns characterized all six societies (Figure 2B-2G), although the 
estimates for punishment of selfish third parties and prosocial third parties were only 
reliably different for Berlin, La Plata, Phoenix, and Pune (additional analyses in the ESM 
show that punishment develops similarly across societies for both selfish and prosocial third 
parties). For the Shuar and the Wichí the developmental pattern for the estimates also looks 
similar to the other societies, but the wide confidence intervals mean we cannot be 
confident that this pattern is reliable. We note that the Shuar and Wichí samples were 
small; we include them for completeness, but interpret them with caution.  
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RQ2: At what age do children become responsive to normative information about 
punishment? 
To assess this we examined the impact of the directed norm primes (Punish-Selfish, 
Punish-Prosocial) on children of different ages. In La Plata, Phoenix, and Pune children who 
viewed the Punish-Selfish prime are more likely to punish selfish third parties than are 
children who viewed the Punish-Prosocial prime (Figure 3C,E,G). This effect emerges by 
about 8 years of age (Figure 3C,E,G). However, the norm primes did not affect the likelihood 
of punishing prosocial third parties in these societies (Figure 3D,F,H).  
In Berlin, Shuar, and Wichí there is no evidence that the directed norm primes 
influenced children’s punishment at any age. In these societies, there was no reliable 
difference in children’s likelihood of punishing selfish third parties or prosocial third parties 
based on whether they were given the Punish-Selfish (Figure 3A,I,K) or Punish-Prosocial 
prime (Figure 3B,J,L).  
 
RQ3: Does the content of norms influence children’s responsiveness to those norms? 
The analyses of RQ1 and RQ2 suggest that, in at least some societies, the Punish-
Selfish prime increased children’s tendency to punish selfish third parties more than 
prosocial third parties (hereafter “children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties”), 
while the Punish-Prosocial prime decreased children’s bias towards punishing selfish third 
parties. But, are the magnitudes of these effects the same?  
Two interaction terms in Model 5 capture these effects. These interactions are 
between the two dummy parameters for (a) the Punish-Selfish prime or (b) the Punish-
Prosocial prime, and the fixed effect for Third Party Behavior (selfish third party or prosocial 
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third party). These interactions capture the degree to which each of the directed norm 
primes (Punish-Selfish and Punish-Prosocial) increase or decrease children’s bias towards 
punishing selfish third parties, relative to the magnitude of that bias in the Punish-Either 
prime condition (the regression model’s reference level). If the coefficient for the 
interaction “Punish-Selfish prime X Third Party Behavior” is greater than zero, then the 
Punish-Selfish prime increased children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties 
(relative to the Punish-Either prime condition). Similarly, if the coefficient for the interaction 
“Punish-Prosocial prime X Third Party Behavior” is less than zero, then the Punish-Prosocial 
prime decreased children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties (relative to the 
Punish-Either prime condition).  
Figure 4 plots the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for these interactions for 
children of different ages. In La Plata, Phoenix, and Pune, the “Punish-Selfish prime X Third 
Party Behavior” interaction increases with age, and is reliably greater than zero by about 
age 9-10 (Figure 4B,C,D). This indicates that children’s bias towards punishing selfish third 
parties was reliably increased by the Punish-Selfish prime over their bias towards punishing 
selfish third parties when they were given the Punish-Either prime. In contrast, the “Punish-
Prosocial prime X Third Party Behavior” interaction does not reliably differ from zero at any 
age, despite generally being somewhat lower than zero (Figure 4B,C,D). This indicates that 
children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties was not reliably decreased by the 
Punish-Prosocial prime.  
In the other societies (Berlin, Shuar, Wichí), however, there is a different pattern. For 
Berlin, the estimated coefficients for both interactions are essentially identical, and neither 
are reliably different from zero at any age (Figure 4A). This indicates that in Berlin children’s 
bias towards punishing selfish third parties was unaffected by either of the directed norm 
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primes. Similarly, for the Shuar and Wichí, the estimated coefficients for both norm prime 
interactions are not reliably different, nor reliably different from zero (Figure 4E,F). Thus, 
the directed norm primes did not reliably influence children’s bias towards punishing selfish 
third parties. 
 
RQ4: Does the development of children’s responsiveness to norm primes about TPP 
resemble the development of their responsiveness to norm primes about prosocial 
behavior?  
We compared the impact of the directed norm primes (Punish-Selfish, Punish-
Prosocial) on children’s punishment in the TPPG (i.e. the analysis of RQ2), to the impact of 
similar directed norm primes on the same children’s prosocial behavior in the DG 
(conducted in the same experimental session, prior to the TPPG; these data have been 
published previously [12]). In the TPPG, children’s punishment of selfish third parties 
displayed a reliable responsiveness to norm primes by about 6-8 years at the latest, but only 
in La Plata, Phoenix and Pune (Figure 5A,C,E,G,I,K; same as Figure 3A,C,E,G,I,K). However, in 
the DG, children displayed a responsiveness to norm primes in all six of the societies (Figure 
5B,D,F,H,J,L). This responsiveness to norm primes in the DG emerged in all societies by age 
7-8 at the latest, but it emerged much earlier in some societies, perhaps prior to age 4 in 
Berlin (Figure 5b) and Phoenix (Figure 5f). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has four primary findings. (1) Children in four of the six societies (Berlin, La 
Plata, Phoenix, Pune) show a reliable bias towards punishing selfish third parties more than 
prosocial third parties by 9-10 years of age. (2) In three of the four societies in which 
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children show this pattern, reliable responsiveness to information about social norms for 
punishment emerged by about age 6-8. (3) In these three societies, norms directing the 
punishment of selfishness had a more substantial influence on children’s behavior than did 
norms directing the punishment of prosociality (i.e. norms directing the punishment of 
selfishness increased children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties to a greater 
degree than norms directing the punishment of prosociality decreased children’s bias 
towards punishing selfish third parties). (4) In the three societies in which norms reliably 
influenced TPP, this influence increased during middle childhood (about age 6-12) when 
norms also begin to increasingly influence prosociality. Together, these findings reveal 
broad similarities across societies in the development of costly punishment and the 
influence of social norms on punishment. However, they also indicate that the link between 
punishment and social norms may vary in important ways across societies, and this may be 
related to societal differences in the content of local norms for punishment and children’s 
understanding of those norms.  
In the four societies in which children show a reliable bias towards punishing selfish 
third parties, this pattern is clearly visible by middle childhood. The Punish-Either norm 
prime does not direct children towards punishing either of the third parties, so any bias 
towards punishing selfish third parties must come from the preferences that subjects 
brought into the experiment. In four of the six societies (Berlin, Phoenix, La Plata and Pune) 
this bias became reliable by about 9-10 years of age. In prior studies with American children, 
6-yr olds were more willing to give up rewards to punish selfish third parties than prosocial 
third parties [29,31], and 3-yr olds were more willing to forego doing a fun activity to 
prevent selfish third parties from doing the same activity, and less likely to forego the 
activity for a prosocial third party [27]. Our estimate for the timing of the divergence 
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between punishing selfish and prosocial third parties may be conservative, because the 
Punish-Either norm prime states that punishing both selfish and prosocial third parties is 
“ok”. This may have dampened differences in the likelihood of punishing selfish and 
prosocial third parties. However, this phrasing of the undirected norm prime also reduces 
the likelihood that subjects made choices based on what they thought the experimenter 
wanted them to choose. If such a demand effect would have the greatest impact on 
younger children, then our design may diminish these effects and provide a more accurate 
picture of the development of children’s preferences for TPP. Future studies should explore 
this possibility by comparing an ‘undirected’ norm prime condition to a ‘baseline’ condition 
with no norm prime of any kind.  
Our results are consistent with prior findings that children develop a bias towards 
punishing selfish third parties between ages 6 and 8 [29,32]. One study with 7-11 year-old 
Italian children found no developmental effects in TPP (17), but compared children’s (a) 
willingness to incur costs to punish selfish third parties to their (b) willingness to incur costs 
that would not affect any third parties. It is possible that the psychological processes 
affecting decisions about whether or not to punish a third party develop differently from 
those affecting decisions about whether selfish third parties should be punished more than 
prosocial third parties. 
Children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties increased during middle 
childhood, and this developmental pattern is similar across societies. Middle childhood is 
also when children across diverse societies become more prosocial [12,20,38,39] and more 
averse to advantageous inequity [40]. This raises the possibility that prosociality, 
advantageous inequity aversion, and TPP may be developmentally coupled. In each of these 
cases, individuals incur personal costs to produce fairer outcomes for others. One 
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explanation for this is that children become more responsive to social norms during middle 
childhood, leading them to become more likely to conform to social norms. This is 
consistent with our finding that norm primes begin to shape behavior during middle 
childhood (although TPP norm primes were not effective in all societies). This also matches 
the timing of children’s responsiveness to information about social norms in the DG, in the 
same set of societies [12]. Children in all six of our populations were more likely to choose 
1/1 after receiving a norm prime indicating that 1/1 is ‘right’, and less likely to choose 1/1 
after receiving the norm prime indicating that 2/0 is ‘right’, and this pattern emerged by 7-8 
years in all of these societies (Figure 5B,D,F,H,J,L).  
Children’s TPP did not respond to information about social norms in some societies 
(Shuar, Wichí, Berlin), even though children’s prosocial behavior in these societies 
responded to nearly identical norm primes in the DG (Figure 5). For the Shuar and Wichí, 
differences in responsiveness to norm primes in the DG and the TPPG might reflect the 
content of children’s prior beliefs about norms for punishing third parties. Shuar and Wichí 
children did not show a reliable bias towards punishing selfish third parties in the undirected 
prime condition, and this might reflect relatively weak prior beliefs about the 
appropriateness of punishing selfish third parties.  
It is also possible that the strength of children’s prior beliefs about norms for 
punishing third parties may affect their responsiveness to norm primes. If children in some 
societies were relatively more certain about their prior beliefs about punishing selfish third 
parties, then the norm primes would have had relatively less impact in those societies. This 
might be particularly important for explaining why children in Berlin were responsive to 
norm primes in the DG (Figure 5B), but not in the TPPG (Figure 5A). Children in Berlin 
showed a tendency to punish selfish third parties more than prosocial third parties in the 
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TPPG (Figure 2B). If children in Berlin were more certain that this was the correct thing to do 
than children in other societies (i.e. La Plata, Phoenix, Pune), then the behavior of children 
in Berlin would be less influenced by directed norm primes than the behavior of children in 
other societies.  
Additional evidence that the strength of children’s prior beliefs plays a role comes 
from the fact that the Punish-Selfish norm was more influential on children’s choices than 
the Punish-Prosocial norm. Children’s relative unwillingness to punish prosocial choices by 
third parties in the Punish-Prosocial condition is particularly notable because, by answering 
a comprehension question asking about the norm prime video, they had already explicitly 
reported that it is ‘good’ to punish a third party who is prosocial. There is no particular 
reason for this pattern of results to be observed unless children were interpreting the 
content of each norm prime through their prior normative beliefs about punishing selfish 
and prosocial third parties. Another way to put this is that children in all six of our societies 
may be certain that punishing prosocial third parties is incorrect, but children in some of the 
societies may be uncertain about whether punishing selfish third parties is correct. If this is 
true, it would make sense that the Punish-Prosocial norm prime wouldn’t sway children’s 
choices even in those societies where the Punish-Selfish norm prime did sway them (i.e. La 
Plata, Phoenix, Pune).  
Together, these results point to broad, but not universal, similarities in the 
development of costly punishment across societies. They also support the idea that middle 
childhood is a period during which children’s sense of fairness is becoming increasingly 
responsive to social norms, and that societal variation in different kinds of fair behavior (e.g. 
prosociality, inequity aversion, TPP) emerges through the development of a universal 
human norm psychology which motivates individuals to conform to their society’s norms. 
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Table 1: Populations sampled. For more details see Supplementary Table 1. 
Population [Location]; Description N (female) / age range (in years) 
German [Berlin, DEU]; Urban 110 (55)  /  4.07 - 13.36  
Argentinian [La Plata, ARG]; Urban 111 (53)  /  5.02 - 13.86  
Wichí [Misión Chaqueña, ARG]; Rural, sedentized hunter-gatherers 61 (35)  /  6.47 - 13.61 
American [Phoenix, USA]; Urban 140 (73)  /  4.52 - 12.63  
Indian [Pune, IND]; Urban 149 (72)  /  4.11 - 13.92  
Shuar [Amazonia, ECU]; Rural, small-scale horticulture, hunting 32 (15)  /  6.59 - 12.5  
 
Table 2: WAIC analysis. Best fit model is Model 5. 
Model Model Parameters 
(DV: Subject Punished [1=yes]) 
WAIC 
(SE) 
dWAIC 
(dSE) 
AIC 
weight 
1 Hypothesis: Children punish Selfish Third Parties (TPs) and Prosocial TPs 
differently. Fixed Effect: Third Party Behavior (Selfish TP=1, Prosocial TP=0). 
Random Effect: Actor ID 
1441.8 
(25.78) 
39.5 
(14.54) 
<0.01 
2 Hypothesis: Children punish Selfish TPs and Prosocial TPs differently, and 
this tendency varies across age. Fixed Effects: Third Party Behavior * Subject 
Age (centered). Random Effect: Actor ID 
1430.9 
(26.80) 
28.6 
(12.60) 
<0.01 
3 Hypothesis: Children punish Selfish TPs and Prosocial TPs differently, and 
this tendency is influenced by novel normative information about who to 
punish. Fixed Effects: Third Party Behavior * Dummies for Normative Primes 
[2: Dummy for Punish-Selfish TP Prime, Dummy for Punish-Prosocial TP 
Prime; Reference level = Punish-Either Prime. Random Effect: Actor ID 
1431.8 
(27.02) 
29.4 
(12.32) 
<0.01 
4 Hypothesis: Children punish Selfish TPs and Prosocial TPs differently, this 
tendency is influenced by normative information, and these effects vary 
across age. Fixed Effects: Third Party Behavior * Subject Age * Dummies for 
Normative Primes [2]. Random Effect: Actor ID 
1424.6 
(28.74) 
22.3 
(9.76) 
<0.01 
5 Hypothesis: Children punish Selfish TPs and Prosocial TPs differently, this 
tendency is influenced by normative information, and these effects vary 
across both age and societies. Fixed Effects: Third Party Behavior * Subject 
Age * Dummies for Normative Primes [2]. Random Effects: Actor ID, 
Subject’s Society 
1402.3 
(31.07) 
0.00 
(NA) 
~1.00 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Arrangement of the apparatus and testing area (Site: Berlin, Germany). 
 
!  
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Figure 2: Estimated probability that children in each society will punish a selfish third party and a 
prosocial third party, for the Punish-Either norm prime only. This captures children’s tendency to 
punish a selfish third party more than a prosocial third party without receiving normative 
information directing them towards punishing either. Solid lines represent estimated probabilities 
for punishing selfish third parties, dashed lines represent estimated probabilities for punishing 
prosocial third parties. Shaded regions represent 95% Confidence Intervals for these estimates. 
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Figure 3: Estimated probability that children in each society will punish selfish third parties 
(3A,C,E,G,I,K) and prosocial third parties (3B,D,F,H,J,L), across the three norm primes. Solid lines 
represent estimated probabilities for Punish-Either, dotted lines represent estimated probabilities 
for Punish-Selfish, and short/long dashed lines represent estimated probabilities for Punish-
Prosocial. Shaded regions represent 95% Confidence Intervals for these estimates.  
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Figure 4: Effect sizes of regression coefficients for the interactions “Punish-Selfish prime X Third 
Party Behavior” and  “Punish-Prosocial prime X Third Party Behavior”, plotted as a function of child 
age. These capture the degree to which the two directed norm primes (Punish-Selfish and Punish-
Prosocial) increase or decrease children’s bias towards punishing selfish third parties more than 
prosocial third parties, relative to that bias in the Punish-Either prime condition. Solid lines represent 
estimated probabilities for the Punish-Selfish prime (i.e. “Punish-Selfish X Third Party Behavior” 
interaction), dashed lines represent estimated probabilities for the Punish-Prosocial prime (i.e. 
“Punish-Prosocial X Third Party Behavior” interaction). Shaded regions represent 95% Confidence 
Intervals for these estimates. Where the lines are reliably above zero (4B,C,D), this indicates that the 
prime (either Punish-Selfish or Punish-Prosocial) has reliably increased children’s bias towards 
punishing selfish third parties more than prosocial third parties, above children’s bias towards this in 
the Punish-Either prime condition. 
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Figure 5: Comparing the influence of the norm primes on children’s probability of punishing Selfish 
third parties (5A,C,E,G,I,K; identical to Figure 3A,C,E,G,I,K), to the influence of nearly identical norm 
primes on children’s probability of making a prosocial choice (5B,D,F,H,J,L), results drawn from a 
previously published study using similar methods with the same sample of children (House et al., 
2019). In each society, children’s prosociality was previously responsive to norm primes, even in 
societies where children’s punishment is not responsive to norm primes in the current study. 
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